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 Current United Nations Sanctions Resolutions (UNSCR) on the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have slightly hindered the nation’s ability to 
procure, proliferate, and test essential resources and elements of its nuclear weapons 
program. Although nine UNSCRs have been adopted since 2006, the DPRK’s nuclear 
program has further developed, despite pressure from the United Nations and 
international community calling on the nation to denuclearize. As of December 2020, the 
DPRK has continued its proliferation of materials and resources to build and sustain its 
nuclear program and has not agreed to denuclearization agreements and negotiations. The 
overarching objective of UNSCRs is to eventually influence the DPRK to denuclearize, 
although UNSCRs have only accomplished its secondary goal of delaying nuclear 
progression by making it more difficult for the DPRK to acquire the necessary materials 
to build and sustain its nuclear program. In short, the three proposals this study offers are:  
incentivize the DPRK to rejoin the negotiating table to achieve partial or full 
denuclearization, establish a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and incentivize UN 
Member States and DPRK trade partners to halt trade with the DPRK. The predicted 
methods rely on reestablishing diplomatic talks or relationships, such as resuming summit 
discussions with the United States or United Nations (or another nation/world body) and 
incentivizing the DPRK to return to negotiations. Incentives include offering the DPRK 
economic reward; for example, proposing membership into world market organizations, 
such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, in 
exchange for denuclearization. Incentivizing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons 
for economic prosperity could increase the likelihood that the DPRK will denuclearize, as 
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the nation’s economy is one of the world’s lowest. As such, the purpose of this study is to 
examine the nine UNSCRs currently in place and test the three proposals on the Libya 
and Iran denuclearization models as testing the proposals on the DPRK is not possible. 
Results of the study conclude that the three proposals tested against experiences and 
lessons drawn from Libya and Iran are feasible and practical options for moving forward 
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Introduction:   
 
 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), colloquially known as 
North Korea, has been systematically evading United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Sanctions Resolutions since its first nuclear weapons test in 2006. As a direct response to 
the DPRK’s illicit nuclear program, the UN Security Council imposed the first of nine 
UN Sanctions Resolutions (UNSCR) on the nation. Discouraging the DPRK’s testing and 
use of nuclear weapons is a challenging effort, however, as nuclear weapons have the 
potential to cause tremendous, irreversible damage to the safety and security of humanity 
and the planet, this effort is necessary. The threat of nuclear war is a major cause for 
concern as the DPRK has consistently refused to full denuclearization under previously 
agreed upon terms, despite countless economic and material sanctions severely limiting 
the DPRK’s trade and revenue generation. Aimed at restricting the DPRK’s ability to 
procure and test nuclear weapons, sanctions resolutions have only mildly disturbed the 
overall program and has made it more difficult, but not impossible, for the DPRK to 
acquire the supplies and funds needed to sustain and build its nuclear program. Further, 
the DPRK’s apparent and methodical disregard for sanctions and restrictions is causing a 
direct and dangerous threat on the international security posture.  
 In recent years, the DPRK has publicly denounced and refused to participate in 
various international treaties, including the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), agreements made by nations with the 
objective to end the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The DPRK had 
previously signed the NPT in 1985, though the nation withdrew in 2003.1 The DPRK 
 




claimed that development of its nuclear power industry was, “the best method for 
resolving the electricity issue in our country’s conditions” and it “legally restricted the 
usage of atomic power to only peaceful purposes.”2 Further, the DPRK’s international 
“rapsheet” includes, conducting and supporting international terrorism, illegal drug, 
human, wildlife, and arms trafficking, counterfeiting goods and money, and the largest 
threat on the international community, nuclear weapons proliferation, procurement, and 
testing.3 At its core, the DPRK is a criminal state and the entirety of its government 
thrives on revenue produced through its criminal activity. After causing and sustaining its 
own rejection from the international community, the DPRK relies on criminal activity to 
generate revenue to support the regime’s continued desire for a “world-class” nuclear 
weapons program.  
 The purpose of this study is to draw comparisons from denuclearization efforts 
conducted with either Libya or Iran (or both). As implementing and testing real, new 
sanctions language on the DPRK and employing actual incentives to test these theories is 
not possible for the purpose of this study, discussing feasible approaches and incentives 
drawn from comparative analysis between the Libya and Iran model and DPRK may be a 
productive way forward. Through comparative analysis and theoretical tests, this study 
aims to answer the research question of: what incentives and proposals should the 
international community offer and utilize against the DPRK in exchange for limiting or 
eliminating its nuclear weapons program? Further, what can the international community 
 
2 Ibid.  
3 Rexton Kan and Bruce Bechtol, “Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International 
Activities,” JSTOR, 2010, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11861, vii. 
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learn from previous denuclearization experiences that may be effective in achieving 
denuclearization of the DPRK? 
 
Background: 
DPRK Nuclear Program 
 When President Donald J. Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, the U.S. 
policy towards the DPRK was reformed as the nation’s growing nuclear and ballistic 
missile program had rapidly established itself as the international community’s most 
serious security challenge.4 The Trump Administration sought a serious and lasting 
arrangement that would, “rollback Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program,” which at the 
time, was thought to include an estimated fifty kilograms of separated plutonium, 
“enough material for more than 10 warheads.”5 DPRK leader Kim Jong Un’s intention to 
expand his nation’s nuclear arsenal was met with direct attempts by the U.S. and other 
nations to significantly weaken the DPRK’s ability to proliferate nuclear goods, as well 
as its ability to generate revenue to continue funding its nuclear program. The new 
approach the Trump Administration advertised and urged other nations to follow was a 
policy plan to work with regional partners and increase pressure on the DPRK. By 
increasing pressure on the DPRK, later evolving into the U.S.’ “maximum pressure” 
campaign, the nation would be further isolated and eventually be forced to fully 
denuclearize. The need for nations, such as China, to enforce UN sanctions and possible 
sanctions on China to “enhance its compliance,”6 were also proposed, but did not lead to 
 






substantial actions or impact. Additionally, maintaining this policy ultimately did not 
halt, or even weaken, the DPRK’s nuclear advances and the nation has continued its 
nuclear procurement and illicit revenue generating activities.  
 In September 2017, the DPRK conducted a hydrogen bomb test that subsequently 
raised “international alarm due to the yield of its explosion”7 and the U.S. redesignated 
the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism. Between January and November 2017, the 
DPRK’s relationship with the U.S. and its allies was extremely hostile, as both the U.S. 
and its allies, and the DPRK, threatened military action against each other.8 The DPRK 
flaunted a nuclear tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could allegedly 
reach U.S. soil,9 which was interpreted by the U.S. as a threat, and the U.S. warned of a 
potential, retaliatory military strike. In March 2018, historic news regarding the “First 
U.S. – North Korea Summit” 10 was scheduled to occur in Singapore and after years of 
hostile relations between the DPRK and international community, it was assessed that the 
DPRK was agreeing to participate in a summit due to fears of a military attack, ongoing 
sanctions pressure, and the realization that negotiations may ease strict policies. The 
planned meeting of Kim Jong Un and President Trump would become the first meeting 
between a sitting U.S. President and DPRK leader, however, the summit was delayed in 
late-May 2018 after the DPRK’s continued threats and inability to commit to negotiations 
angered the U.S. and the international community. Finally, in June 2018, the momentous 
meeting in Singapore was held where the theme of the summit was to improve the U.S.-
 
7 “North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: A Brief History” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
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DPRK relationship in which both parties signed a joint statement, “pledging to pursue 
lasting peace and complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”11 Importantly, 
President Trump agreed to suspend U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) military exercises, 
which are planned exercises where both the U.S. and the ROK hold military drills in case 
of potential conflict with the DPRK, and Kim Jong Un agreed to destroy a missile engine 
test site.12 A few months later in September 2018, Kim Jong Un and ROK President 
Moon Jae-in met to sign a joint-Koreas declaration that detailed the two nations’ 
objectives to reduce tension and increase cooperation.13 From the DPRK’s viewpoint, the 
U.S. did not adhere to President Trump’s pledge and diplomatic relations did not 
improve.  
 Moving forward, in February 2019, President Trump and Kim Jong Un held a 
second summit in Vietnam, but significant disagreements concerning sanctions relief and 
denuclearization14 caused tensions, as both parties could not reach a set agreement: 
Trump says Kim agreed to dismantle the nuclear and fissile material production 
facilities…in exchange for complete sanctions relief, but the U.S. president 
wanted more substantial steps on denuclearization and verification. North Korean 
officials dispute Trump’s account, saying Kim demanded only partial sanctions 
relief. Both leaders leave Vietnam early, without signing a planned joint 
statement, but indicate talks will continue. Trump says they parted on “friendly” 
terms, while North Korea’s foreign ministry warns it will not change its 
position.15 
 
Most recently, in June 2019, President Trump and Kim Jong Un recommenced the 









talks in Sweden in October broke off”16 and resolutions were not met. Ultimately, the 
summits and talks did not produce productive results as the DPRK’s primary concern of 
lessening strict sanctions, and the U.S.’ goal of reaching denuclearization agreements 
were not met. While the DPRK has been able to creatively evade UNSCRs, it was 
seeking the easing of sanctions to alleviate this ongoing challenge as sanctions 
significantly impact its ability to generate revenue and sustain its nuclear program. 
However, without official commitment and/or evidence of denuclearization, the UN and 
broader international community will not lift sanctions against the DPRK and without 
easing of sanctions, the DPRK has indicated that it will not denuclearize.  
 
Current UN Sanctions Resolutions on the DPRK  
 The acquisition and proliferation of nuclear weapons, along with materials to 
construct and eventually test nuclear weapons, is currently one of the world’s greatest 
threats on international security. Nuclear weapons are considered a weapon of last resort 
and after the conclusion of World War II and the constant threat and fear of nuclear 
warfare during the Cold War, nuclear weapons have become rather taboo, meaning that 
the use of nuclear weapons in any manner or scenario is an unthinkable and “forbidden” 
action. While there are many laws, sanctions, restrictions, and agreements in place that 
discourage the use and testing of nuclear weapons, the DPRK is an international 
“cockroach,” surviving all attempts by the international community to fully denuclearize 
the state. After initial attempts, such as the NPT, to restrict the DPRK’s nuclear program, 
 





the UN was forced to enact and conduct an official condemnation against the DPRK. The 
UN’s dedicated efforts to restrict the DPRK in the twenty-first century began in October 
2006 when, “North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, despite warnings by 
the country’s principal economic benefactors, China and South Korea, not to proceed.”17  
 Between 2006 and 2017, the UN Security Council has imposed nine UNSCRs on 
the DPRK: Resolution 1718 (2006), Resolution 1874 (2009), Resolution 2087 (2013), 
Resolution 2094 (2013), Resolution 2270 (2016), Resolution 2321 (2016), Resolution 
2371 (2017), Resolution 2375 (2017), Resolution 2397 (2017). The UN Security Council 
determined that the most appropriate way forward was to impose significant and 
impactful UNSCRs against the DPRK that all UN member-states must enforce. The UN 
recognized that the DPRK “problem” needed to be met with compromise on all sides, 
especially as the U.S. was promoting a tough, unwavering stance and China and Russia 
were opting for a more lenient approach against the DPRK. Each UNSCR is a direct and 
calculated attempt at motivating the DPRK to cease its illicit activities, all of such illicit 
activities are in violation of the previous UNSCR. Although the nine UNSCRs are in 
place to restrict and deter the DPRK’s criminal activity, the DPRK has, on a global scale, 
continued to commit these crimes and are committing even more offenses by directly 
violating these UNSCRs.  
 To understand what proposals may work when deterring the DPRK from its 
continued nuclear efforts, the details of nine major UNSCRs on the DPRK that have been 
enacted in response to its nuclear and missile activities offers unique insight and provides 
foundation for assessing the successes and failures of each UNSCR placed on the DPRK 
 
17 Marcus Noland, “The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea,” Asia Policy 7, no. 1 (2009): pp. 
61-88, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2009.0047, 63. 
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(see Appendix). When evaluating all nine UNSCRs and determining if any successfully 
led to the denuclearization of the DPRK, the analysis indicates that the overall outcome 
of each resulted in failure. However, the UNSCRs are partially succeeding by causing 
and sustaining major limitations in how the DPRK’s nuclear program is able to operate. 
The strain and stress UNSCRs place on the DPRK’s revenue and nuclear material 
generating programs has promoted varying levels of negotiations (both successful and 
unsuccessful) with the DPRK as the strict sanctions and policies are difficult, but not 
impossible, to navigate around. The UNSCRs anticipated outcome of denuclearizing the 
DPRK failed, while the alternative goal of forcing the DPRK back to the negotiation 
table became more realistic.  
 
Overview of Existing Thought on DPRK Denuclearization: 
 Sanctions experts have argued that a UNSCR itself is not going to change a state’s 
objective, especially if the state is building and sustaining a nuclear program. The desire 
to nuclearize indicates that the nation is already in noncompliance with numerous 
international sanctions and norms and an UNSCR is not going to change this behavior. In 
the DPRK’s case, its dismissal and continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is a result 
of the state believing that it has a right to nuclearize and is entitled to disregard UNSCRs. 
However, to make an overarching statement such as, “UNSCRs never work” is incorrect 
as, “the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the alternative policy instruments available 
to policy practitioners.”18  
 
18 Thomas Biersteker and Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, “How and When Do Sanctions Work? The Evidence,” 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015, 17. 
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 Another factor to consider is the lack of diplomatic relationship with the DPRK 
and how this has also led to the failure of UNSCRs: 
…if basic conditions for success are not met or if the agreed measures are 
not implemented, then a sanction should actually be expected to fail… if 
no or very little economic or diplomatic exchange was taking place before 
sanctions were enacted, then the impact of sanctions will inevitably be 
weaker.19 
 
This theory assists in explaining the failures of sanctions against the DPRK as the UN 
and its member states have been unsuccessful in its attempts to form an effective 
diplomatic relationship with the DPRK. While the DPRK does have some form of 
cursory diplomatic relationship with over one hundred nations, these nations have not 
provided much assistance in working with the DPRK and have not produced any 
significant impact on the DPRK’s relationship with the UN. In order to achieve desired 
diplomatic relations with the DPRK, the question of, “what does the DPRK want?” must 
be explored. It is apparent that the DPRK “wants” to sustain its nuclear program, but is 
the nation willing to negotiate and disarm certain aspects of this program if it means 
sanctions would ease? Sanctions experts argue that the DPRK is largely unwilling to 
agree to full denuclearization simply because the negotiations have not resulted in any 
DPRK-desired outcomes. Negotiations have not resulted in any attractive incentives for 
the DPRK to denuclearize, although this is where diplomatic talks and continued 
negotiation would greatly benefit. Additionally, experts assess that the DPRK’s continued 
pursuit of its nuclear program is not necessarily its desire to be armed, but DPRK 
officials view the U.S.’ pressure originates from its belief that:  
…the only purpose of US policy is to liquidate the DPRK as a state or even 
“physically destroy” the country and its leadership. The regime does not believe 





US, and rather sees this demand as an attempt to undermine the country’s 
deterrence and gain advantage for a military solution of the Korean issue or 
regime change by other means.20 
 
Diplomatic talks and active negotiations would ease these judgements and allow active 
dialogue between the DPRK and UN (and other entities) to reach a feasible, compromise 
to achieve all objectives.  
 
Proposals 
 To achieve denuclearization of the DPRK, this report offers three proposals that 
will be tested and evaluated against similar case-studies of Libya or Iran’s 
denuclearization efforts. The proposals were created after review of UNSCRs and 
analyzing existing thought on this topic and comparable case studies were discovered to 
evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the offered ideas. The three proposals include, (1) 
incentivizing the DPRK to return to negotiations regarding denuclearization, (2) 
establishing a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and (3) incentivizing UN member 
states and DPRK trade partners to enforce sanctions. 
 
(1) Incentivize the DPRK to Negotiate 
 This first proposal requires elements of both establishing diplomatic talks with the 
DPRK, as well as incentivizing the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. In order to 
entice the DPRK, diplomatic talks are needed to promote potential incentives for the 
country’s denuclearization and member states and trade partners will need to enforce 
 
20 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, William Brown, and Leo Byrne, “Can Diplomacy Work with North 




sanctions to further highlight the gain the DPRK will incur. Currently, the DPRK is one 
of the world’s lowest ranking economies and relies almost entirely on China for revenue 
generated from both import and export with the country. Providing the DPRK incentives 
that promote economic gain, such as admission into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank will attract the 
DPRK. In 2010, it was projected that the DPRK’s trade volume would increase by, “5.6 
to 8.3 times…if North Korea were to become a normal economy.”21 Additionally and 
from these same projections, “if North Korea were to move toward reform and 
denuclearization, inter-Korean trade would grow rapidly from the present amount of 
roughly $2 billion per year to approximately $11 to $16 billion per year by 2020.”22 By 
refusing to denuclearize, over time, the DPRK is costing itself several billion dollars in 
revenue and it is predicted that it would have even more money as the nuclear program 
will no longer require significant monetary funding. 23 By offering admission into world 
trade market organizations and presenting these economic projections to the DPRK, the 
DPRK will feel pressure to rejoin negotiations and secure a more stable economic future.  
 
(2) Establish a Diplomatic Relationship with the DPRK  
 For sanctions to be effective in accomplishing the end objective of dismantling 
the DPRK’s nuclear program, a concrete, diplomatic relationship and frequent diplomatic 
talks with the DPRK are necessary to achieve successful strategies for denuclearization. 
In this study, the term “diplomatic relations” is defined as an official diplomatic 
 
21 Scott Snyder, “The Economic Costs of North Korean Nuclear Development,” Council on Foreign 





relationship, or “multilateral diplomacy,” as an alternative to current, official diplomatic 
relations. Multilateral diplomacy is, “the management of international relations by 
negotiations among three or more states through diplomatic or governmental 
representatives, but it can also be engaged in by representatives of non-state actors.”24 
This lack of an official, diplomatic relationship is limiting the success of UN sanctions 
and prolonging international security concerns surrounding the DPRK’s nuclear program. 
The issues are prolonged when the DPRK suddenly conducts a nuclear test and new 
sanctions are implemented without any discussion from either side. By re-offering the 
DPRK an official avenue for negotiation, significant improvement can be made by 
creating a diplomatic channel that allows transparency and promotes active cooperation 
with nations such as the U.S., who hold tremendous influence over the international 
community’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear program.  
 
(3) Incentivize UN Member States and DPRK Trade Partners   
 For an UNSCR to function as intended, the sanctioned nation should acknowledge 
and adhere to these restrictions, but more importantly, UN member states must enforce it. 
As there are issues with DPRK trade partners enforcing such sanctions, there must be 
incentives for these nations to enforce UNSCRs on the DPRK. The issue rests on the 
reliance the DPRK has formed with its key trade partners. As identified, the DPRK relies 
on crucial trade partners to evade sanctions and without the assistance from such trade 
partners, the sanctions would actually enforce an effective deterrent and lead to a 
negotiated denuclearization of the DPRK. Potential incentives include implementing a 
 
24 James P. Muldoon Jr. and JoAnn Fagot Aviel, “Multilateral Diplomacy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia 
of International Studies, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.462. 
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justice for action program, where the UN and its member states participate in a global 
effort to motivate the DPRK to denuclearize and dismantle its nuclear arms program and 
activities through full enforcement of sanctions. Other incentives, such as economic and 
political incentives, have also been successful. Lastly, should incentives prove largely 
ineffective, shifting to maximum pressure practices such as imposing sanctions on 
nations who violate these UNSCRs will promote quick and impactful results.25 Adopting 
additional sanctions that specifically target noncomplying nations would ultimately force 
these nations to reconsider their trade with the DPRK. Successful models include denying 
nations access to the U.S. market and only lifting these restrictions when the nation halts 
its trade with the sanctioned nation. Should the DPRK’s trade partners prompt its own 
sanctions, potentially limiting its access to world trade, it is predicted that the nations 
would choose the world market over trade with the DPRK.26  
 As of 2017, a large number of nations still engage in trade, both import and 
export, with the DPRK, despite increased international pressure to halt such exchanges. 
Export destinations include, Pakistan, India, Ghana, and China; import destinations 
include, Russia, India, Peru, Honduras, and China.27 China accounts for an astounding 
ninety-four percent of imports and ninety-one percent of exports for the DPRK.28 As 
such, incentivizing these nations to halt all trade with the DPRK to further isolate the 
nation, as well as strictly enforcing sanctions will decrease the DPRK’s sanctions evasion 
practices as it would no longer have trade partners enabling trade that sustains its nuclear 
 
25 Arshad Mohammed and Michelle Nichols, “U.S. Plans to Enforce U.N. Sanctions on Iran with Its Own 
Action,” (September 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-britain-iran/u-s-plans-to-enforce-u-
n-sanctions-on-iran-with-its-own-action-idUSKBN2672UE. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Katharina Buchholz and Felix Richter, “Infographic: Who Is North-Korea Trading With?,” Statista 




pursuits. Subsequently, the DPRK will be negatively impacted and its ability to survive 
without negotiating to reopen trade is unlikely. Further, providing economic incentives to 
trade nations by increasing its legitimate and approved trade will positively impact its 
ability to halt trade with the DPRK. By providing comparable, or if possible, a greater 
revenue stream, these nations would no longer require the DPRK as a trade partner.  
 
Methods: 
 This study assesses that drawing conclusions and best practices, also referred to as 
historical analogies, from either the Libya or Iran model, or both, will reveal if the 
proposed methods are feasible/infeasible, desirable/undesirable, and/or likely to be 
effective or ineffective. Although, the application of a historical analogy is extremely 
important and determining the feasibility of a particular analogy is often very 
challenging. Ernest R. May and Richard Neustadt in Thinking In Time: The Uses Of 
History For Decision Makers, explain that there is a fine line between the correct and 
incorrect use of history in decision making. May and Neustadt urge policymakers to 
consider how lessons from history must be used cautiously and meticulously as seeking 
analogies from history can both, “inform and misinform the assessment of current issues 
and events.”29 May and Neustadt also argue that the importance of a historical analogy 
relies on history’s successes and failures as the foundation for accurately constructing 
predictions. In other words, leaders must study history not as a narrative of events, but as 
a way to discover appropriate parallels to apply to current and future issues. When using 
 
29 Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, “Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. Richard E. 




historical analogies correctly, it can inform government officials and policymakers of 
potential, practical tactics that may be successful (or unsuccessful) with a current political 
issue.  
 The DPRK issue is unique as it involves advanced nuclear proliferation activities 
and testing; however, both the Libya and Iran’s denuclearization models contain 
comparable elements to consider (for different proposals) as both nations had or have 
nuclear ambitions, but have been otherwise motivated, discouraged, and/or forced to 
comply with restrictions when it sought to engage in nuclear pursuit. By evaluating and 
demonstrating the feasibility of each proposal against either the Libya or Iran models (or 
both), assessing the success of these comparisons rely on how either nation (or both) 
reacted to similar tactics and will determine if the proposed solutions are a promising way 
forward against the DPRK. To clarify, this study does not aim to specifically test all three 
proposals on the denuclearization models of both Libya and Iran; rather, this study aims 
to evaluate the offered proposals against elements found in either the Libya or Iran 
denuclearization models to determine feasible/infeasible, desirable/undesirable, and/or 
likely to be effective or ineffective, with one proposal’s data overlapping both models.   
 By including both Libya and Iran in this case-study comparison, the expected 
lessons learned/successes and failures from either/both models will provide valuable 
context and perspective for how to approach the denuclearization of the DPRK, or at 
least, offer milestones that must be met before abandoning all proposed strategies and 
enacting final and non-negotiable restrictions on the DPRK. Once the three proposals 
were determined, the research involved finding relevant case studies to assess the 
feasibility and likely effectiveness of each proposal, based on data found from previous 
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denuclearization experiences. Libya and Iran were selected with May and Neustadt’s 
historical analogy guidance in mind as numerous nations have experienced 
denuclearization, either voluntarily or forced, though the Libya and Iran models offer 
specific, relevant comparisons to this study’s three proposals (evaluated in Data section). 
Overall, this study aims to conclude if elements of denuclearization experiences with 
either Libya or Iran (or both) are appropriate historical analogies for the DPRK issue. 
 Relatedly, Markus Kornprobst in Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and 
Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies writes that historical analogies are, “important 
tools to make sense of the world. This applies to the decision-makers we study as well as 
to us as students of world politics.”30 Although, some historical analogies can lead 
policymakers astray and the Libya and Iran models for the DPRK issue are not precisely 
similar (but also not entirely dissimilar), “to some extent historical analogies always 
compare apples and oranges.”31 While the methods used with Libya and Iran cannot be 
replicated exactly, this study assesses that the DPRK issue will require this comparison of 
“apples to oranges.” Keeping in mind that a perfect historical analogy does not exist, this 
study proposes methods that were successful with Libya and/or Iran and offers 
comparable and applicable similarities. As such, this study is comparing apples and 
oranges and is only able to draw successes and failures from similar, analogous models, 
vice an identical and successful denuclearization case to use directly with the DPRK. 
 To determine which specific proposals and resulting testing methods are most 
practical for the purposes of this project, the primary consideration concerns the lack of 
 
30 Markus Kornprobst, “Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical 
Analogies,” SAGE Journals, 2007, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070360010301, 29. 
31 Ibid, 30-31. 
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publicly available and accessible data on the DPRK’s nuclear efforts. Information that is 
not available concerns the DPRK’s own comprehensive analysis and response to current 
sanctions and other denuclearization efforts. Aside from public statements made – aimed 
at sharing an often-incorrect narrative of the DPRK’s nuclear program –  the data 
concerning the DPRK’s internal response to sanctions and denuclearization efforts are 
not available on open-source research platforms. For this reason, testing and evaluating 
this project’s proposals in comparison to the DPRK itself is not a practical test model and 
the Libya and Iran models are used as the comparison, in its place.  
 
Evaluative Criteria –  
While the simplest approach is to utilize existing UNSCRs and the international 
community’s pressure to denuclearize the DPRK, the proposed, new variables must be 
introduced into the test. To reiterate, (1) providing economic incentives to the DPRK, (2) 
establishing an official and lasting diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and (3) 
offering incentives for cooperation by nations providing assistance to the DPRK are 
assessed to aid in the denuclearization of the DPRK.  Each proposal, as it relates to the 
DPRK, coupled with relevant data found from either the Libya or Iran models (or both) 
are evaluated as: feasible/infeasible, desirable/undesirable, and likely to be 
effective/ineffective. As the study specifically sought to find data that supports and 
strengthens the arguments presented in each proposal, the only elements that were 
negative (infeasible, undesirable, and likely to be ineffective) were found when compared 
against a model that did not offer an accurate analogy. For example, each proposal was 
evaluated against both the Libya and Iran model, though the study found that only 
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Proposal 2 proved feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective, based on 
denuclearization experiences of both Libya and Iran. Proposal 1 and 3 were evaluated 
against only Iran and were feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective, as the Iran model 
offered a much more relevant and analogous comparison to accurately test this study’s 
proposals.  
 
Proposal 1: Based on initial research, it was predicted that the Iran model is feasible, 
desirable, and likely to be effective when compared against efforts to denuclearize the 
DPRK. As Libya’s denuclearization was achieved primarily through successful 
diplomacy, the Libya model does not provide valuable analogies to evaluate and test 
against Proposal 1. Of course, there are various elements that must work together to 
achieve successful results, however, for this proposal, it is assessed that the Iran model 
offers a much more feasible and effective approach to incentivizing the DPRK to 
negotiate. The DPRK’s inability to join world trade market organizations, as well as its 
inability to trade with the rest of the world economy, is severely limiting its economic 
potential. Of course, the DPRK is inflicting this economic hardship on itself as adhering 
to sanctions and denuclearizing will solve this issue, however, the nation likely requires 
outside incentives or influences to cast a “spotlight” on the benefits of this proposal. 
Assessing the results of economic incentives within the Iran model will offer concrete 





Proposal 2: The experiences drawn from the Libya and Iran models were predicted to 
reveal that establishing an official diplomatic relationship with the DPRK is a feasible, 
desirable, and likely to be effective proposal. Based on factors drawn from both models, 
this proposal has been highly effective with Libya and consistently effective with Iran. As 
such, there is a high likelihood that this same method, or substantial features of this 
proposal, will be successful with the DPRK. To test this proposal the Libya and Iran 
model were used as the comparative example. While it was assessed that the Libya model 
is one that would offer successful strategies to diplomatically engage with the DPRK and 
will be useful in predicting the success or failure of this proposal, the Iran model also 
relies heavily on multilateral diplomacy and can offer relevant analogies for achieving 
similar, successful results with the DPRK. Specifically, the Libya model is a comparable 
case-study and presents notable, relevant strategies to consider in determining the most 
achievable methods in deterring the DPRK from continuing to expand its nuclear 
program.  
 
Proposal 3: Based on factors gathered from the Iran model, this proposal is hypothesized 
to be, feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective as the success of the Iran model 
advises that member states and DPRK trade partners will avoid trade with the DPRK, if 
assessed that sanctions are a legitimate consequence for continued trade. To test this 
proposal, Iran model will be used as the comparative example as the Libya model does 
not include specific incentives provided to UN member states and trade partners. Further, 
an element of this method also involves creating circumstances that strongly encourages 
nations to impose and adhere to set sanctions. Relying on nations to enforce sanctions on 
 
 20 
the DPRK is a difficult task, but offering incentives to ease its decision-making will 
provide better, more impactful results. In particular, economic incentives that allow trade 
partners to fully abandon the DPRK for economic prosperity will be possible, if the 
incentives and justifications are enticing enough. The obtainable result is creating a 
situation where the DPRK is unable to trade with the rest of the world, just as the 
sanctions initially intended, which forces the DPRK to return to negotiations. From past 
and present methods in the Iran model, the UN and its member states have been able to 
incentivize nations to halt trade and enforce sanctions on Iran.  
 
Data: 
 Through focused research and case-study analysis, it was discovered that the 
aggressive approach and strategy utilized with Libya and Iran, including pressure and 
confrontation, were successful for both scenarios. In testing the three proposals that were 
principally successful with Libya or Iran, the effectiveness of diplomatic relations 
between Libya/Iran and the U.S. and UN, the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement 
against Libya and Iran, and specific incentives offered within these models, were found 
to encourage and achieve the desired outcome of halting nuclear pursuit.  
 
Libya  
 The success of the Libya model involves the scenario in which Libya agreed to 
diplomatic relations and was incentivized by recognizing the parallels between economic 
prosperity and diplomatic relations: 
Libyan officials secretly approached the governments of the U.S. and the UK 
about disclosing and ending Libya's WMD program. Thereafter, U.S. and UK 
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negotiating teams held secret sessions with Libyan officials, included visits to 
Libya in which that state revealed the extent of its nuclear activities. The U.S. and 
UK teams asserted that Libya must publicly disclose the extent of its programs 
and pledge to abide by those agreements regulating and monitoring WMD.32 
 
After Libya agreed to denuclearization, the DPRK hinted that improved U.S.-DPRK 
relations could bring its representatives back to the negotiating table. Interestingly, and 
while the DPRK aggressively denied that it would ever cooperate with the international 
community’s objectives to denuclearize, the nation released in this same statement a 
different, gentler sentiment writing, “If the Trump administration takes an approach to the 
DPRK-U.S. summit with sincerity for improved DPRK-U.S. relations, it will receive a 
deserved response from us.”33 In other words, if diplomatic talks are held that promote 
cooperation and appropriate processes, the DPRK will respond appropriately.  
 Parallel to the current efforts with the DPRK, Libya’s nuclear pursuits caused 
various economic sanctions to be enacted by the UN and U.S. as a way to motivate the 
nation to halt its nuclear activity. Sanctions included arms embargoes, air travel 
restrictions, freezing of Libyan assets, and banning oil equipment exports to Libya, which 
were largely disregarded by Libya until improved diplomatic efforts were achieved.34 As 
sanctions tightened against Libya and its trade partners and other UN member states were 
working to enforce these sanctions, Libya approached the United Kingdom and U.S. and 
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 Successful denuclearization efforts were achieved mainly through diplomacy as 
the UN and other nations work to reach realistic agreements with Iran. Looking broadly 
at the various attempts and successes at reaching Iran’s denuclearization, diplomatic 
relations have been the common denominator and accomplish denuclearization goals. 
Although Iran has often presented an adamant stance that it will continue building its 
nuclear program, diplomacy and adhering to diplomatic precedent has seemingly 
motivated Iran more than any other tactic. Rather than dismissing negotiations and 
continuing to develop a nuclear program, Iran appears to: 
…leave the door open for diplomacy…Tehran has “never been hesitant to 
negotiate,” and that “it is the U.S. that has to show that it is committed to the deal 
– that it will not violate it again, that it will not make demands outside the scope 
of the deal, that it will compensate Iran for the damages.”35   
 
The DPRK is seeking a similar commitment from the U.S. or UN in hopes that any 
agreed negotiations will truly benefit the DPRK and provide some comparable 
compensation for denuclearizing, rather than agreeing to denuclearize solely because of 
increasing pressure. Along with strategic diplomacy, also known as, “diplomacy that 
fulfills desired goals by using available means in the most effective way,”36 UN member 
states and Iran’s trade partners enforcing sanctions have led to successful negotiations 
and agreements with Iran over its nuclear pursuit. The success of the Iran model, 
“illustrated by effective sanctions” and most importantly, “high-level political 
communications,”37 otherwise recognized as establishing a diplomatic relationship, are 
 
35 “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran,” Arms Control Association, 2020, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran. 





necessary to resolve the DPRK issue. Iran agreed to denuclearizing elements of its 
nuclear program and accepted limitations on its ability to continue developing nuclear 
weapons. Rather than full denuclearization, Iran agreed to follow restrictions and 
sanctions on its nuclear program. From the Iran model it was learned that limiting and 
restricting Iran’s nuclear program was a much more realistic and attainable goal than 
demanding full denuclearization. The DPRK could be amenable to limitations and 
restrictions rather than terminating its nuclear program all at once. 
 The goal of sanctions on Iran and the DPRK is to impact trade and limit economic 
potential, thus forcing the DPRK to abandon the illicit activity in return for the easing of 
sanctions. With strict sanctions that aim to severely limit Iran’s market, nations are 
hesitant to engage in deals with Iran for fear of prompting sanctions against themselves 
for blatantly violating these sanctions and conducting this trade. However, evaluation 
reveals that shifting to maximum pressure methods and enforcing sanctions on nations 
that are not complying, is the most suitable method for sanctions enforcement.   
 The strategy used on Iran involves imposing heavy economic sanctions as a 
bargaining tool, on both Iran and member states.38 The success of the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal was 
possible due to member states’ enforcement and support of such a deal, followed by 
Iran’s agreement. The JCPOA, “places restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange 
for easing global oil, trade, and financial sanctions.”39 In order to uphold this deal, 
member states and Iran’s trade partners must fully comply with the set restrictions to 
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ensure that Iran is adhering to all sanctions and the JCPOA. The agreement was endorsed 
by P5+1 coalition (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, and Germany), the European 
Union, and Iran.”40 In accordance with the JCPOA, Iran is required to adhere to a number 
of nuclear restriction mandates, including lowering uranium enrichment levels and other 
specific milestones to reduce Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.41 Additionally, 
repercussions of enabling or supporting Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions evasions 
calls for sanctions to be placed on the enabling nation. In September 2020, the U.S. 
shifted its strategy towards noncomplying nations in the Iran model and warned: 
The United States expects all UN Member States to fully comply with their 
obligations to implement these measures…If UN Member States fail to fulfill 
their obligations to implement these sanctions, the United States is prepared to use 
our domestic authorities to impose consequences for those failures and ensure that 
Iran does not reap the benefits of UN-prohibited activity.42 
 
(1) Incentivizing the DPRK to Negotiate 
 Diplomacy and denuclearization was achieved by incentivizing Libya to 
negotiate. Libya recognized that improving and sustaining a healthy relationship with the 
UN and U.S. would bring greater economic and political prosperity for the nation – 
prosperity that could not be met if Libya continued its nuclear pursuit. While the 
similarity between the Libya model and the DPRK issue broadly concerns offering 
incentivizing reason to negotiate (improved diplomatic relations), the DPRK requires 
strong economic incentives for sanctions and eventual negotiations to be effective. As 
such, a parallel approach is to motivate the DPRK to reengage negotiations by providing 
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economic incentives. By agreeing to ease sanctions that severely impact the DPRK’s 
economic system, the DPRK may be willing to denuclearize parts, or all, of its nuclear 
program, just as Iran did. Specifically, lifting sanctions resolution 2397, 2371, and 2375, 
which limit oil imports, coal, iron ore, lead, and bans exports of textile products, “can be 
alleviated commensurate to the denuclearization process.”43 The sanctions on imports and 
exports has caused significant financial strain on the DPRK and economic sanctions 
reliefs could be a possible, forcing hand. The DPRK could be incentivized to 
denuclearize if they are offered membership in the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank,44 
allowing its participation in legitimate trade and guiding its establishment as a 
functioning nation in the international market.  
 Iran is a member of both the World Bank45 and the IMF,46 but is not a member of 
the WTO.47 The DPRK’s membership in any world organization would require set 
obligations and transparency as Iran has attempted to join the WTO, “over twenty times 
in the last two decades, however, there were objections…about the nation’s nuclear 
activity.”48 After the JCPOA and amendment of strict sanctions, Iran has become much 
closer to joining the trade organization, but will need to comply to additional trade 
organization and sanctions requirements before its admittance.49 Joining the WTO has 
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been used as a leveraging strategy to denuclearize Iran as joining the organization would 
increase the nation’s ability to export its goods, all with significantly lower tariffs.50 Iran 
applied for membership into the WTO in 1996, and since 2005, has held a “observer 
status,” instead of official membership.51 Due to Iran’s continued nuclear pursuits, it has 
been barred from officially entering the WTO; the “accession process is actually 
member-driven” and consistently puts Iran at a disadvantage when seeking WTO 
admittance.52 Since the WTO is described as, being the only international organization to 
set and regulate global trade,”53 it has been leveraged to engage and motivate Iran’s 
compliance with sanctions. Iran’s acceptance into the WTO has been barred due to the 
nation’s continued nuclear pursuit and member states that have rejected Iran’s 
membership share that its membership will be considered only if it adheres to and 
complies with sanctions.54 Economic sanctions and Iran’s inability to trade freely with the 
international market caused the country’s exports to decline, “33 percent on average, 
totaling USD 104 billion in lost revenues,”55 from 2012-2014 alone. Although Iran has 
denuclearized without first gaining membership into the WTO, WTO membership 
represents collective economic improvements, or successes, Iran can reach if continued 
negotiations and active cooperation are achieved. Membership into the WTO and 
economic successes it would bring, is a reminder to Iran that it can improve its economy 
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and improve trade, along with easing economic sanctions aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear 
pursuits.   
 With sanctions restricting Iran’s energy trade, membership into the WTO would 
promote and sustain successful trade for Iran. Comparatively, the DPRK’s global 
economic status and revenue generation is incredibly low and membership into the WTO 
and other global financial institutions will quickly improve the nation’s economic 
standing. However, just as Iran’s admittance into the WTO requires, the DPRK will need 
to agree to denuclearization, or at least partial denuclearization, and provide evidence that 
it has done so before any consideration of admission. Although the DPRK believes it can 
survive by trading with just a few trade partners, the successful economic incentives to 
halt trade with the DPRK will force the DPRK to consider a comparable agreement to the 
WTO’s stipulations for Iran’s membership. Although Iran agreed to denuclearization 
efforts without first gaining admittance into the WTO, it recognized that negotiating its 
partial denuclearization would open many other economic opportunities,56 entrance into 
the WTO opening just one of many “doors” back into the world market. As the DPRK 
has indicated that easing sanctions could lead to accepting limits on its nuclear program, 
proposing enticing incentives would offer similar, if not greater motivation for the DPRK 
to accept to denuclearization negotiations. Lastly, incentivizing the DPRK to 
denuclearize in exchange for admittance into these world groups is a major motivating 
factor and will secure the DPRK’s interest in rejoining negotiations, meaning that this last 
 





proposal is feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective, based on comparisons drawn 
from the Iran model.  
 
(2) Establishing a Diplomatic Relationship with the DPRK  
 The DPRK’s history of systematic criminal activity and sanctions violations is a 
major concern and establishing an official, multilateral diplomatic relationship is a likely 
solution to these issues. The lack of multilateral relationships with key world powers has 
only prolonged these issues and caused UNSCRs to be principally ineffective and largely 
evaded by the DPRK. Diplomatic relations would not only increase each side’s 
understanding of each other’s motivations, but the summit talks hinted that the DPRK 
may seriously negotiate if it felt it had more allies in the international community. In 
other words, giving the DPRK an opportunity to create an alliance, under the right 
circumstances, could be an incentive worthy of denuclearization.  
 After the summit in Vietnam ended without diplomatic agreement, the DPRK 
continued to stress that it would implement, “denuclearization measures in exchange for 
sanction relief.”57 As sanctions relief is a key objective for the DPRK, the probability of 
lifting sanctions without establishing formal agreements and subsequent, working 
diplomatic relationships to reach such agreements, is currently nonexistent. However, as 
discussed in this study, incentivizing the DPRK to establish this relationship (and 
bringing the DPRK to the negotiating table) indicates this to be a feasible 
recommendation. Thus far, the DPRK has been unwilling to renegotiate and 





believes that the U.S. has been unwilling to compromise and reach reasonable 
agreements. Both the persistence of the DPRK and that it has not “liked” any of the 
proposed agreements suggests that the nation requires different motivations to both 
reengage in negotiations and to consequently agree to cooperate. If denuclearization talks 
continue, the UN and its member states, “could face the question of whether to aim for 
incremental dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program in step with gradual 
sanctions relief, or to try for a ‘big deal’ and demand that complete denuclearization 
precede full sanctions relief.”58  
 The UN imposed sanctions on Libya that enacted embargos on its various trade 
activities in condemnation of the country’s terrorist and chemical weapons program, just 
as it has done on the DPRK for these same reasons. While Libya’s final concession and 
agreement to dismantle its nuclear program was likely due to the country’s fear of war, 
“the years of sanctions and diplomatic efforts were more important.”59 Well before the 
invasion of Iraq, the UN placed pressure on Libya in an effort to reprimand the country 
for its terrorist activities and nuclear pursuits and a serious break in diplomatic affairs 
occurred in 1981 when the U.S. expelled Libyan diplomats and closed the Embassy, 
signaling that the U.S. would no longer conduct diplomatic affairs with Libya. In 1995, 
“Libya makes a ‘strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities…”60 and the UN 
and international community increased its pressure on the country and stressed the 
importance of diplomatic talks to reach an agreement. Throughout this, Libya was 
actively looking to reestablish diplomatic talks as a way to request that the UN and 
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international community lift sanctions and after years of restrictions and diplomatic 
pressure on Libya, the nation dismantled its nuclear program and allowed inspectors to 
verify its claims.61 Libya recognized that reestablishing and holding diplomatic relations 
with the rest of the world would provide greater benefits than continuing to pursue a 
nuclear program. The country’s willingness and desire to reestablish diplomatic relations 
allowed this model to be successful as both sides were able to compromise and the end-
goal of Libya’s denuclearization was achieved. 
 The willingness to denuclearize was driven and decided by Muammar al-Qaddafi 
who assessed that membership and acceptance within the international community was 
far more valuable and lasting than continuing to pursue a nuclear program. The success 
with Qaddafi and Libya’s denuclearization was achieved through secret, diplomatic talks 
and the DPRK could benefit from a similar approach. While pressure from the 
international community increased on Libya, Qaddafi quietly conceded and met with the 
U.S. and United Kingdom in March 200362 to establish and proceed with the agreed upon 
framework: 
Following those talks between [Libya] and the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom… [Libya] decided of its own free will to eliminate such 
materials, equipment and programmes, thus ridding itself of all internationally 
proscribed weapons.63 
 
Rather than continuing in the public eye and creating increased tension with the 
international community, Libya agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. As the 
international community is closely watching the DPRK and likely influencing the 
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DPRK’s decisions to continue its nuclear program, similar secret talks and agreements 
made between the DPRK and U.S. (or other world powers) could provide a much-needed 
avenue for negotiation, away from the immense pressure and influence of the 
international community. 
 Therefore, the Libya model was successful and as predicted, is a feasible, 
desirable, and likely to effective model. In 2006, as agreed upon for dismantling its 
nuclear program, Libya established full diplomatic relations with the U.S. and other 
international partners. Throughout this process, an important message was received by 
Libya and sent to other nuclearized states –  “In taking these actions, the United States 
dramatically demonstrates to the remaining rogue states…that our country takes note of 
positive changes in behavior and is more than willing to reciprocate.”64 In an effort to 
directly share these sentiments with the DPRK, former U.S. Representative Tom Lantos 
traveled to the DPRK and explicitly argued that, “abandoning nuclear weapons – as 
Libya had done – would open the door to diplomatic relations with the United States and 
to significant improvements in bilateral political and economic relations.”65 This “door” 
would need to be open as part of negotiations, as it was for Libya, and offer the DPRK a 
glimpse at what it could benefit from by establishing full diplomatic relations with the 
U.S. and its allies.  
  Holding secret negotiations could be a major “selling point” for the DPRK as 
Kim Jong Un may agree to new negotiations if discussions are private and away from 
“critics” who would claim he is being weak or foolish for denuclearizing. In other words, 
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the DPRK could “save face,” as did al-Qadaffi, and both sides could reach the necessary 
agreements to reach a realistic compromise. With ego and pride driving Kim Jong Un’s 
nuclear desires, providing the DPRK with an opportunity to negotiate in private and away 
from “critics” could influence the DPRK to join the negotiation table and initiate and 
sustain denuclearization talks. As Libya was incentivized to improve its relationship with 
the U.S. and rest of the international community for the country’s livelihood and 
economic prosperity, the DPRK’s struggling economy and perpetual need for assistance 
provides a comparable model and accessible means to achieve a similar result.  
 
(3) Incentives for UN Member States and DPRK Trade Partners  
 Under the terms of the JCPOA, “Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear 
program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in 
exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.”66 The UN, U.S., and 
European Union agreed to lift its nuclear-related sanctions on Iran by easing, 
“restrictions on financial transactions, which have deterred international trade with 
Iran.”67 Additionally, an existing UN weapons embargo was lifted and if any JCPOA 
participant suspects, “Iran is violating the deal, the UN Security Council may vote on 
whether to continue sanctions relief.”68 Iran was able to evade sanctions with the 
help of its trade partners who benefited from Iran’s exports, such as oil and natural 
gas. Similarly to the DPRK, Iran would have been unable to evade UNSCRs without 
assistance from trade partners, meaning that the intended consequences of sanctions 
 






relied on Iran’s trade partners halting trade and enforcing these restrictions.69 As the 
UN and JCPOA signatories were well aware of Iran’s sanctions evasion practices, 
before the JCPOA was adopted, and before Iran could achieve sanctions relief, 
certification of Iran’s halted nuclear activities was required.70 As a result, “Iran 
agreed to eventually implement a protocol that would allow IAEA [The International 
Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors unfettered access to its nuclear facilities and 
potentially to undeclared sites.”71  
 The DPRK is unable to evade sanctions on its own and requires assistance from 
its limited, but resourceful, trade partners to survive the strain UNSCRs impose on its 
nuclear program and other revenue generating activities. Based on comparisons drawn 
from the Iran model, incentivizing and rewarding nations to enforce such sanctions 
reveals an efficient and impactful practice that has the great potential to negatively 
impact the DPRK’s sanctions evasions tactics in these regions and eventually, around the 
world. Upon further analysis of the Iran model in comparison to the DPRK, it was 
discovered that relying on other nations to enforce the sanctions was a challenge as it was 
difficult to convince these non-complying nations of the impending and significant 
security concern Iran posed on the international community.72 The Iran model found that 
the challenges of incentive-based agreements require, “…significant domestic political 
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consensus that this goal is in the national interest, both in the country that would 
surrender such strategic weapons and in the countries that would aid them in doing so. 
Attaining this consensus usually requires serious internal bargaining...”73 The UN was 
also concerned that nations would only uphold these sanctions to receive the incentives 
promised,74 although having nations enforce sanctions against the DPRK, even if it is just 
to receive these promised benefits, would be a positive adjustment from the current 
situation.  
 In 2018, the DPRK imported $2.32 billion and exported $291 million worth of 
product.75 Some additional nations not previously mentioned that conduct trade with the 
DPRK are: Zambia, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Switzerland.76 To sustain its 
own economic system as well as believing that maintaining an economic relationship will 
positively influence the DPRK, these nations are engaging in trade with the DPRK, 
ignoring any position supporting or opposing the DPRK’s nuclear program. By providing 
economic incentives comparable or greater than what these nations are able to generate 
through trade with the DPRK, nations that are merely conducting trade with the DPRK 
for economic survival will no longer need to continue this exchange. The incentive relies 
on being able to replace, or match in some manner, the $2.32 billion revenue generated so 
trade partners are not losing revenue. To replace this revenue, this method would 










 For example, in 2019, Zambia exported an estimated $611.24 thousand worth of, 
“pearls, precious stones, metals, coins.”77 India and Hong Kong are the world’s leading 
pearl importers,78 but India in particular does not import pearls from Zambia.79 By 
guiding Zambia towards pearl trade, or similar goods exchange, with India, Zambia’s 
reliance on the DPRK to generate export revenue on pearls will no longer exist. 
Additional trade “swaps” will allow the DPRK’s trade partners to wean its reliance off of 
the DPRK. As such, promoting these nations’ trade products would sever the reliance on 
the DPRK and allow these nations to comfortably enforce trade sanctions against the 
DPRK, without suffering negative, economic consequences.  
 Moreover, incentivizing China to halt trade with the DPRK will cripple the 
DPRK’s entire trade and economic system as it relies on China for most of its import and 
export. China is another factor linking the similar effects of sanctions on Iran and the 
DPRK.80 China is cited as fostering diplomatic relationships with both Iran and the 
DPRK, endorsing the DPRK’s illicit activities:  
China has become a dominant trading partner of both Iran and North Korea, 
giving it significant leverage both in its relations with those two countries and 
with the United States…China has used its position on the U.N. Security Council 
to delay or weaken sanctions, while choosing to loosely or selectively enforce 
them. Still, the West needs to work with China to use its leverage to intensify 
diplomatic efforts with both Iran and North Korea.81  
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Motivating China to halt all trade with the DPRK relies on providing specific economic 
incentives. Additional incentives, economic or otherwise, as expressed by China can also 
provide ample incentive for it to abandon its trade relationship with the DPRK. Severing 
the economic relationship with China, will force the DPRK to reconsider its economic 
and trade system, thus well positioning the international community to request that the 
DPRK rejoin denuclearization negotiations. Trade partners will halt all trade with the 
DPRK if a similar threat of looming sanctions is seriously anticipated. In an effort to 
sustain its own economic system and trade, DPRK trade partners would likely refrain 
and/or halt all trade activity.  
 
 Using Libya and Iran as comparative case studies offers concepts, theories, and 
actionable policy objectives and strategies for the UN and international community to 
consider. By using tactics that were successful with either Libya or Iran (or both) as  
examples, the international community must shift its current strategic efforts and 
incorporate one or more of these proposals against the DPRK. The DPRK issue is 
changing, daily, and predicting a feasible action plan relies on a system of trial and error. 
However, as this project deduces, drawing from, and modifying policies that were 
successful with Libya and Iran, predicts an actionable and implementable way forward 
against the DPRK for the UN and the international community, allowing for necessary 







 The importance of each proposal utilized against the DPRK was found from 
experiences drawn from the Libya and Iran models. Although the perfect DPRK analogy 
does not currently exist, the findings of this study reveal that relevant elements of the 
Libya and/or Iran models can be combined to create a feasible approach. The existing 
difference between the DPRK and Libya and Iran concerns the idea that the latter nations 
were fundamentally open to negotiating and assessed that complying with sanctions and 
falling to international pressure, would be beneficial for its well-being and future 
objectives. Libya was motivated to comply to international pressure through improved 
diplomatic relationships with the West and Iran is motivated continuously by diplomacy 
and increased economic incentives. Furthermore, a key distinction between the DPRK 
issue versus the Libya and Iran issue is that the U.S. and its allies have been in and out of 
the Middle East for the last 30 years. The established military footprint and active 
cooperation from regional host governments to counter a wide variety of threats was 
possible when the international community was defending against Libya, and current 
efforts to defend against Iran. Defending against the DPRK requires an altered approach 
as the U.S. and its allies have a rather small presence on the Korean peninsula, in 
comparison to the presence in the Middle East. Approximately 28,500 U.S. personnel are 
supporting the United States Forces Korea operation in the ROK,82 vastly smaller than 
current estimations that there are over 80,000 U.S. personnel presently defending in the 
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Middle East83 and the approximate 199,400 U.S. forces84 in the Middle East at the time of 
Libya’s agreement in 2003. While the presence in Northeast Asia is much more 
integrated and deliberate than the widely dispersed troops in the Middle East, the lack of 
“boots on the ground” and show of force (according to troop numbers) in the DPRK and 
the inability to impose a show of military force over the nuclearized nation has severely 
restricted the international community’s ability to diplomatically, or otherwise, reach 
agreements with the DPRK.  
 Further, the international community’s approach towards Iran differs from its past 
and current efforts against the DPRK. In 2002, when it was first reported that Iran was 
operating an “elusive uranium enrichment plant,” key nations engaged in a debate, “as to 
whether to refer the issue to the UN Security Council or give diplomacy a chance to 
resolve the problem.”85 All nine UNSCRs against the DPRK target the DPRK leadership 
and, “underestimated how well the regime could adapt and sustain itself under dire 
circumstances.”86 Iran previously claimed that the development of nuclear weapons was 
to maintain peace87 and would make the international community safer and the DPRK is 
currently making these same claims. Iran was hit heavily with economic sanctions by the 
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U.S., as well as nine UNSCRs that imposed economic embargo, ban on all Iranian 
imports, ban on Iranian aircraft trade, and an arms ban.88 
 Realistically, the DPRK may be an issue that exists well into the future, without 
any effective strategies or methods to combat the nation’s growing nuclear desire. Rather 
than look for ways to fully denuclearize the DPRK, approaching the situation with 
specific objectives and milestones, drawn from the Libya and/or Iran model may be a 
more feasible way forward. Although diplomatic talks and incentives may or may not 
resolve the issues of continued DPRK nuclear testing, talks and incentives will eventually 
lead to the DPRK’s assurances of closing nuclear plants, destroying a number of ICBMs, 
and leading the DPRK towards reconsidering its plans for eventual, full denuclearization 
– likely depending on the amount of effort and assistance other nations are willing to 
provide. There are numerous motives for the DPRK’s adamant stance on growing its 
nuclear program, the DPRK’s primary reason for holding onto its nuclear program has 
been cited as safety and security reasons. Although, experts assess the real reason the 
DPRK is unwilling to disarm is Kim Jong Un’s nuclear pride. Admitting that the current 
nuclear program and economic system cannot concurrently function would, “show 
weakness and invite challenges to his own power. He certainly can’t acknowledge the 
failure of his own policy — the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the 
national economy.”89 All three proposals tested in this study offers the DPRK an 
“escape” from its current, broken policies. Diplomatic talks will ease Kim Jong Un’s 
pride and the tremendous economic gain will replace the pride the country feels for its 






nuclear weapons on its enemies, nations that have been categorized as enemies for 
condemning the DPRK’s nuclear pursuit, detract from the DPRK’s ability to work 
strategically with these same nations through established and improved diplomatic 
relations. If the DPRK continues believe that it requires protection and security, methods 




 As expressed throughout this report, the DPRK is a fascinating and unique 
criminal state. The entirety of the nation operates as a criminal enterprise, with illicit 
revenue generating activities sustaining its economic system and funding its prohibited 
nuclear program. If the DPRK was able to join the various world groups, such as the 
WTO, the nuclear nation would not need to conduct criminal activity to sustain its 
economy. This then begs the causality dilemma of, “which came first: the chicken or the 
egg?” In this instance, the dilemma is, which comes first: lifting sanctions to 
economically motivate the DPRK to fully denuclearize so it may join the world market, 
or the DPRK must fully denuclearize before sanctions can be lifted and the economic 
incentive of allowing the nation to join the world market is authorized?   
 Further, the implications of nuclear conflict with the DPRK are of serious concern 
for the international community. With UNSCRs in place to restrict and motivate the 
DPRK to dismantle its nuclear arms program, the questions concerning how this might be 
possible and what necessary steps are required by the UN to enforce such sanctions must 
be addressed before implementing new sanctions or reformed attempts at enforcing 
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current sanctions. By testing and analyzing the Libya and Iran models against the DPRK, 
the findings discovered a key pattern: the DPRK is an entirely elusive threat and the 
nuclearized nation possesses the unmatched ability to provoke fear of nuclear war and 
retaliation. As the DPRK is a varying security threat and has consistently changing 
factors that shift the scope of analysis, the successful methods drawn from the Libya and 
Iran model provided feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective strategies to implement 
against the DPRK.  
 As the comparative tests revealed, diplomatic relationships must be formed with 
the DPRK before any expectation of negotiation or resolution can be desired by the UN 
and international community. Furthermore, conclusions drawn from the Libya and Iran 
model reiterated that the DPRK must be dealt with in an innovative manner, but the 
solutions are not entirely unique. To Kim Jong Un, the only substantial equity the DPRK 
has to lose is its nuclear program, but contrastingly, the DPRK has much to gain, 
economically, if enticed to denuclearize. Lastly, should the international community 
assess that incentives for compliance are not feasible, and UN sanctions are the only 
viable way forward, strict implementation, enforcement, and cooperation from all UN 
member states is critical for its success. With an increasing threat on the safety and 
security of the international community, prioritizing deterrence efforts against the DPRK 
to reduce and/or eliminate the threat of nuclear war is a difficult endeavor that requires 









UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) – 
 On 14 October, a short five days after the DPRK’s first nuclear test, the UN 
Security Council, “unanimously adopted Resolution 1718 imposing economic sanctions 
on North Korea”90 in an effort to reprimand and remind the DPRK that nuclear testing 
and activity will not be tolerated by the UN and the broader international community. 
Concurrently, the UN created the “UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North 
Korea” also known as, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1718,” citing the Security Council’s need for a committee dedicated to monitoring and 
condemning, through appropriate sanctions resolutions, the DPRK’s threatening 
behavior. The Security Council documented:  
Expressing the gravest concern at the claim by the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) that it has conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on 9 October 
2006, and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to international efforts aimed at 
strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the 
danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond.91  
Further, Resolution 1718’s principal provisions demand that the DPRK, “refrain from 
further nuclear or missile tests…shall suspend all ballistic missile activities… shall 
abandon its nuclear program in a ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible’ manner… [and] 
shall abandon all WMD activities.”92 Resolution 1718’s principal sanctions included 
requiring member states to freeze the funds or financial assets of entities providing 
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support for the DPRK’s nuclear, missile, and WMD program,93 as well as prohibiting 
member states from, “the ‘direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer’” to the DPRK 
including, heavy weaponry and spare parts for heavy weaponry (tanks, armored vehicles, 
artillery, combat aircraft, warships and missile systems), materials and technologies that 
could assist the DPRK’s WMD and missile program, and luxury goods.94 A large element 
of Resolution 1718’s monitoring mechanisms included the creation of the Security 
Council’s Committee on North Korea which composed, “of the 15 current members of 
the Security Council to function as a monitoring body to review and adjust the imposed 
sanctions and violations of the sanctions.”95  
 Although Resolution 1718 did not accomplish its intended goal of compelling the 
DPRK to dismantle its nuclear program and activities for good, it was far more successful 
than the previous UNSCRs. After the passage of Resolution 1718, the Six Party Talks, “a 
series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and attended by China, 
Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the purpose of 
dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program”96 occurred and seemingly outlined and 
partially accomplished key objectives in denuclearizing the DPRK. The DPRK initially 
claimed that it would abandon, “‘all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs’ and 
return to the NPT” and the DPRK disabled a plutonium producing nuclear reactor.97 
However, as disagreements concerning methods to verify the DPRK’s commitment to the 
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1718 and its monitoring mechanisms failed as the DPRK continued to build its nuclear 
program, with assistance from long-time, on-again-off-again trade partner, China. The 
intended outcome of Resolution 1718 was to halt the DPRK’s nuclear activities and 
prohibit trade to the DPRK to reduce its ability to procure the necessary materials to 
sustain its nuclear program. Although Resolution 1718 prompted positive negotiations 
with the DPRK, the outcome of Resolution 1718’s failure occurred on 25 May 2009 after 
the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test, despite the UNSCRs in place, Six Party 
Talks, and other international precedents strictly calling for the DPRK to further cease all 
nuclear weapons procurement and testing. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1874  (2009) – 
 On 12 June 2009, Resolution 1874 was unanimously adopted by the Security 
Council and called for the DPRK to join the CTBT and expanded on Resolution 1718’s 
arms embargo by banning, “all imports and exports of weapons, excluding small arms.”98 
Enforceable by Resolution 1874, member states were authorized to, “inspect North Korea 
cargo on land, air, and sea, if the state has reason to believe that it contains prohibited 
items and seize any prohibited materials or technologies.”99 Member states were asked to, 
“prohibit public financial support for trade with North Korea that would contribute to 
nuclear, ballistic missile, or WMD-related activities.”100 Resolution 1874’s monitoring 
mechanisms included establishing a seven member expert panel, the DPRK “Panel of 
 






Experts” to assist the Committee and report on possible violations of sanctions.101 
Further, the Panel of Experts was required to provide recommendations for improving 
sanctions implementations and determine how the DPRK was continuing to evade the 
strict sanctions. The Panel of Experts attempted to impose a sanction that provided an 
objective to the international community, which was to come together to force the DPRK 
to end its nuclear program. The intention was, that if the DPRK did not have materials 
and trade partners to acquire new materials, that it would be forced to denuclearize.  
 By now, the DPRK had set an obvious pattern as it continued to evade and violate 
sanctions without any actionable consequence, aside from prompting additional 
UNSCRs. Unfortunately, Resolution 1874 proved unsuccessful when the DPRK 
successfully launched a satellite on 12 December 2012 – a violation of both Resolution 
1718 and 1874, prohibiting, “any further development of technology applicable to North 
Korea’s ballistic missile programs.”102  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013) – 
 On 22 January 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 which called 
for member states and the broader international community to “remain vigilant” and 
continue monitoring individuals and entities associated with the DPRK in any manner.103 
Resolution 2087’s principal sanctions were expansions of Resolution 1718 and 1874 and 
emphasize states’ rights to, “seize and destroy material suspected of heading to or from 








individuals or entities that have assisted in sanctions evasion.”104 Differing from previous 
sanctions, Resolution 2087 did not implement any new monitoring mechanisms, likely 
due to the UN’s growing realization that the DPRK was not, and is not, adhering to any 
imposed sanctions. Resolution 2087 failed as two months after its adoption, the DPRK 
conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.105 The DPRK’s obvious and 
methodical disregard for UN sanctions was now abundantly clear, however, the Security 
Council and Panel of Experts collectively agreed and decided that imposing yet another 
sanction might finally cause the DPRK to reconsider and disband its nuclear program.  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013) – 
 On 7 March 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 that differed 
from previous sanctions by explicitly mentioning, “uranium enrichment in its 
condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities.”106 This Resolution also noted that the 
DPRK was seemingly abusing the many immunities granted to its diplomats and 
welcomed recommendations on targeting and implementing financial sanctions to urge 
member states to apply and fulfill the sanctions.107 Just as the sanctions before it, 
Resolution 2094 sought to make it more difficult for the DPRK to evade sanctions and 
further its nuclear program, as well as “directing states to enhance vigilance over North 
Korea’s diplomatic personnel.”108 One particular evasion method used, and still used by 










generating activities for the regime. By establishing official Embassies and missions in 
nations that welcomed them, the DPRK conducts complex money and revenue generation 
activities and nuclear procurement activities that are largely barred by UNSCRs. 
However, as DPRK diplomats have the immunity afforded to all diplomats, these 
sanctions evasion techniques were not immediately recognized. Resolution 2094 sought 
to expose this practice and its monitoring mechanisms included expanding the Panel of 
Experts to include eight people, one more than the founding seven Panel of Experts 
members. Three years passed before the Security Council determined that a new 
Resolution was needed to curb the DPRK’s continued illicit activities. Yet again, all 
previous UNSCR’s failed to dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear program as it conducted its 
fourth nuclear test and launched its second satellite on 6 January 2016.  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) – 
 On 2 March 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 which prohibits 
states from providing specialized training and materials to the DPRK and decides that the 
DPRK must abandon all chemical and biological weapons and programs in accordance to 
the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.109 
Additionally, Resolution 2270 calls to expand the arms embargo to include small and 
light weapons, prohibit the DPRK from servicing and repairing weaponry sold to third 
parties, and prohibits the trade of luxury goods.110 Financial implications include, asset 
freezing on all discovered DPRK government and DPRK entities’ financial transactions 
 





in association with prohibited activities. Moreover, this Resolution vastly expanded the 
financial sanctions placed on DPRK banking entities overseas and prohibited UN 
member states from hosting and processing financing that may be associated with 
proliferation efforts, prohibited states from opening new financial institutes in the DPRK, 
and required states to terminate any existing joint-DPRK ventures.111 New monitoring 
mechanisms were not included in Resolution 2270 and it and all past sanctions up until 
2016 proved ineffective and unsuccessful as the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test on 
9 September 2016.  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016) – 
 On 30 November 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2321, which at 
its inception, was the most expansive sanctions resolution on the DPRK, to date. 
Resolution 2321 called for significant reduction of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions 
and consular posts worldwide and for the first time, emphasized the need for the DPRK 
to, “respect the inherent dignity of its people in its territory.”112 Resolution 2321 also 
called for the prohibition of exporting minerals, such as copper, nickel, silver, zinc, iron 
and iron ore, and selling or transferring coal in large amounts.113 Resolution 2321’s 
monitoring mechanisms introduced a, “standard notification form for coal purchases from 
North Korea to track imports against the cap set by the resolution” and also directed the 
Panel of Experts to conduct meetings specifically designed to address regional concerns 
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and, “build capacity to implement the measures in 2321 and other North Korea 
sanctions.”114  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2371 (2017) – 
 On 5 August 2017, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2371 in response to 
the DPRK’s two ICBM tests that occurred in July 2017. The principal restrictions of 
Resolution 2371 bans the export of raw materials, such as seafood, coal, iron and iron 
ore, and lead and lead ore. Additionally, new sanctions language was added that prohibits 
the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank – the DPRK government’s primary exchange bank –  
denies international port access to vessels violating resolutions, and bans states from 
allowing in additional DPRK laborers.115 Essentially, Resolution 2371 is an expansion of 
Resolution 2321 as the Security Council and Panel of Experts again recognized that the 
DPRK was continuing to evade sanctions, without any impact to their nuclear program. 
Resolution 2371’s monitoring mechanisms asks for Interpol to publish DPRK 
individuals’ travel bans to provide the Panel of Experts, “additional analytic resources to 
better monitor sanctions enforcements.”116  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2375 (2017) – 
 Following the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test on 3 September 2017, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 2375 on 11 September 2017, targeting DPRK oil imports, 
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textile exports, and overseas laborers.117 According to the Security Council, this 
Resolution is the strongest sanction against the DPRK and condemns the DPRK for 
pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic weapons over the welfare of its people.118 
Resolution 2375’s principal sanctions state a full ban on textile exports, caps refined 
petroleum imports at 2 million barrels per year, freezes crude oil imports, bans all natural 
gas imports, prohibits member states from approving DPRK nationals to work in their 
jurisdictions otherwise approved by the Panel of Experts, imposes asset freezes on 
discovered DPRK entities revenue generation, and bans all joint ventures or cooperative 
initiatives119 with the DPRK. Its monitoring mechanisms include providing additional 
guidance for states to interdict DPRK cargo and ship transfers. Despite restricting nearly 
every import, export, and revenue generating activity overseas, the DPRK evaded such 
sanctions and increased its illicit ship-to-ship transfers, relying even more on their 
diplomats posted overseas to conduct revenue generating activities to support the regime. 
To the Security Council and international community’s displeasure, the eight sanctions 
placed on the DPRK up until September 2017 were not effective in denuclearizing the 
nation. After Resolution 2375 that called for the most severe restrictions on the DPRK, to 
date,  the DPRK conducted its most recent missile test on 29 November 2017.  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017) – 
 Resolution 2397 is the most recent UN sanction against the DPRK and was 
adopted on 22 December 2017, in direct response to the DPRK’s missile test. Resolution 
 






2397 emphasizes much of Resolution 2375, but in a much stronger effort, calls for the 
expulsion of all DPRK laborers, worldwide.120 Countries were given until 22 December 
2019 to expel DPRK laborers in their nations as it was acknowledged that DPRK laborers 
overseas contribute greatly to its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. 
Additionally, it called for an increased ban on petroleum, crude oil, exports of food, 
agricultural products, minerals, and electrical equipment, in an effort to force the DPRK 
to fully cease its nuclear program. As over a year has passed since the 22 December 2019 
deadline to expel DPRK laborers overseas, the specific impacts of Resolution 2397 are 
largely unknown. It is known that many nations have complied with this Resolution, but 
information is still being gathered on which nations have not fully enforced and expelled 
all DPRK laborers. A caveat to Resolution 2397 that will likely be exploited by the 
DPRK is the ability for most DPRK diplomats to remain in that nation and perform their 
“diplomatic” duties. This could mean that the DPRK will place an even greater strain on 
its diplomats to generate revenue for the regime, thus negating the intention of Resolution 
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